




DATE: July 21, 2023
TO: Mayor Yemi Mobolade
FROM: Lan Rao, Transit Services Manager
VIA: Gayle Sturdivant, Interim Public Works Director 
RE: Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) Update - 2023

Mountain Metropolitan Transit (MMT) is required to maintain a Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) since the agency receives Federal Transit Administration (FTA) funding under its Urbanized Area Formula Grants program. The PTASP is further required to be updated annually and to meet all conditions specified in 49 CFR Parts 625, 630, 670, and 673, including approval by both the agency's Accountable Executive (the Transit Services Manager) and the Approving Entity (the Mayor).

The Plan was updated and approved earlier this year and set safety targets for the 2023 calendar year. This update restructures the Safety Committee to align with requirements set forth in the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act (IIJA).

Background

On July 19, 2018, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) published the Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) Final Rule. The rule requires operators of public transportation systems that receive federal funds under FTA's Urbanized Area Formula Grants to develop safety plans that include processes and procedures to implement Safety Management Systems (SMS). The PTASP must be updated and certified by the transit agency annually.

The original PTASP was approved by the Colorado Springs City Council on October 27, 2020, via Resolution 98-20. Based on the Strong Mayor structure of the City of Colorado Springs, the Mayor can approve annual updates.

2023 Plan Update - June

The second 2023 update to the PTASP includes:

- Restructuring the Safety Committee from a main Committee with focused sub-committees to one Committee. The updated Safety Committee features four (4) frontline worker representatives and four (4) management representatives, in accordance with requirements of the IIJA.
- Adding language allowing the Chief Safety Officer's designee to carry out tasks under the Plan.
- Modifying language regarding when safety items appear on Contractor agendas.

Recommendation

Approve and sign the update to the Mountain Metropolitan Transit Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan.

ATTACHMENT



2023
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
AGENCY SAFETY PLAN (PTASP)

Mountain Metropolitan Transit

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Executive Summary

The City of Colorado Springs, d/b/a Mountain Metropolitan Transit (MMT), is committed to comprehensive safety planning. As an administrator of a public transportation system that receives federal financial assistance under Title 49 of the United States Code (USC) Chapter 53, the transit agency is subject to 49 CFR Parts 625, 630, 670, and 673. This Safety Plan is fully compliant with those rules, as well as with the requirements of the National Public Transportation Safety Plan (NSP) as promulgated through 49 CFR 670.

Annual Review and Update

This plan will be reviewed by the Safety Committee and updated by the Chief Safety Officer by December 31st of each year. Annual updates will include the targets, goals, and objectives for the upcoming year. The Safety Committee will review and approve any changes, and the Transit Manager will then sign the PTASP. The PTASP will then be forwarded to the Mayor for review and approval.

Originally Approved by Colorado Springs City Council on October 27, 2020, via Resolution 98-20.

Version Number and Updates

Version Number	Section/Pages Affected	Reasons for Change	Date Issued
1	1-35	New Document	10/01/2020
2	1-35	Annual Update	3/1/2022
3	2, 4, 5, 9-11, 16, 17	Annual Update	1/9/2023
4	2-3, 5-24	Safety Committee Update	6/14/2023

Safety Committee Approval Date:

June 20, 2023

Accountable Executive:

Lan Rao

Lan Rao, Transit Services Manager

Jun 26, 2023

Date

Approving Entity:

Blessing A. Mobolade

Blessing A. Mobolade
Mayor of the City of Colorado Springs

8/4/23

Date

Mountain Metropolitan Transit Safety Policy

Safety is, and has always been, a core value of Mountain Metropolitan Transit (MMT) and is the cornerstone for building and maintaining a successful transit operation. MMT's overarching mission is to provide high quality, safe, and reliable public transit services to its community. Without a strong commitment to ensuring the safety of its riders, vehicle operators, mechanics, and staff, MMT would not be able to carry out its mission.

As part of MMT's commitment to safety, the agency pledges to meet the following objectives:

- MMT will continue to develop, implement, coordinate, maintain, and continuously improve processes to ensure the safety of our customers, employees, and the public.
- MMT will continue to cultivate a culture of open reporting regarding all safety concerns, ensuring that no action will be taken against any employee who discloses a safety concern through the Employee Safety Reporting Program (ESRP), unless such disclosure indicates, beyond any reasonable doubt, an illegal act, gross negligence, or a deliberate or willful disregard of regulations or procedures occurred.
- Annually, MMT will establish safety performance targets that are realistic, measurable, and data driven.
- MMT will continuously improve its safety performance through management processes that ensure appropriate safety management action is taken and is effective.
- MMT will ensure its PTASP and operations are consistent with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and State of Colorado Public Health guidelines to minimize exposure to infectious diseases.
- MMT will continue to coordinate with the Pikes Peak Regional Office of Emergency Management, as well as the City of Colorado Springs Human Resources Department on safety objectives.
- MMT Management will continue to be involved in creating and carrying out an effective ESRP and will dedicate the appropriate resources to the program.
- MMT relies on its Safety Committee, which has been restructured to meet requirements defined in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill and to best suit the needs of the agency, to carry out the duties set forth in 49 USC §5329(d)(5)(iii).
- The Chief Safety Officer will communicate the purpose and benefits of the Safety Management System (SMS) to all staff, managers, supervisors, employees, and service contractors on a quarterly basis, at a minimum.
- MMT Program Coordinators will ensure their respective service contractors meet or exceed SMS safety goals as outlined in this document through safety-focused oversight and communication.

Safety Targets

MMT's Accountable Executive (AE) shares the PTASP, including annual safety performance targets, with the Pikes Peak Area Council of Governments (PPACG), the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), each year after its approval by the Mayor. The AE also provides a copy of MMT's approved plan to the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT). MMT personnel are available to coordinate with PPACG and CDOT in the selection of regional and state safety performance targets upon request.

The following table contains actual 2022 safety event data, how each category compared to the previous plan year's target (↑ for increase and ↓ for decrease) and 2023 targets by mode of service. Targeted rates represent at least a 10% decrease from the last year's data. Targets are updated annually using the previous year's data.

	Motor Bus (MB), or Fixed Route		Demand Response ADA Complementary Paratransit (DR)		Vanpool (VP)	
	2022	2023 Target	2022	2023 Target	2022	2023 Target
Total Accidents	263 ↑	236	13	11	0 ↓	0
Per 100k RM ¹	10.66 ↑	9.59	1.94 ↓	1.75	0 ↓	0
Total Incidents	10 ↓	9	0 ↓	0	0	0
Per 100k RM	0.41 ↓	0.37	0 ↓	0	0	0
Total Occurrences	16 ↓	14	5 ↑	4	0	0
Per 100k RM	0.65 ↓	0.59	0.75 ↑	0.68	0	0
Total Safety Events	289 ↓	260	18 ↓	16	0 ↓	0
Per 100k RM	11.72 ↓	10.55	2.69 ↓	2.42	0 ↓	0
Injuries	12 ↓	10	0 ↓	0	0	0
Per 100k RM	0.49 ↓	0.44	0 ↓	0	0	0
Fatalities	0	0	0	0	0	0
Per 100k RM	0	0	0	0	0	0
Minor NTD Reportable (S&S-50)	2 ↓	1	0	0	0	0
Per 100k RM	0.08 ↓	0.07	0 ↓	0	0	0
Major NTD Reportable (S&S-40)	7	6	1 ↑	0	0 ↓	0
Per 100k RM	0.28 ↓	0.25	0.15 ↑	0.14	0 ↓	0

Overall, total safety events decreased by 67% in 2022 from 2021. However, accidents on the fixed-route mode increased. Curbed tires are classified as accidents and accounted for 52.85% of all fixed-route accidents in 2022. Most curbed tires occurred during new drivers' first few trips in revenue service or while they were cadets being mentored by more senior drivers.

Organizational Structure

MMT contracts over 90% of its services to private contractors. Safety requirements are not only outlined in this PTASP, but also included in some form or fashion in each contract.

Contractors are responsible for providing an adequately trained workforce and all employment matters, including discipline, are handled by each contractor for their respective employees. MMT does not participate in employee disciplinary procedures. However, if MMT finds that one of the contractor employees has engaged in an unsafe practice and the issue has not been or cannot be corrected, MMT may request removal of that employee from providing services under its contract with their employer.

¹ Per 100,000 vehicle revenue miles. Revenue miles are those miles driven when the vehicle is providing public transportation and is available to carry passengers.

Accountable Executive

The Transit Manager serves as the agency's Accountable Executive (AE) and has the following authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities under this plan:

- Controlling and directing human and capital resources needed to develop and maintain the ASP and SMS.
- Designating an adequately trained Chief Safety Officer, who is a direct report.
- Maintaining responsibility for carrying out the agency's Transit Asset Management Plan.
- Ensuring that MMT's SMS is effectively implemented.
- Ensuring action is taken to address any substandard performance of any contractor or MMT staff.
- Sharing the agency's Safety Plan, including safety performance targets, with the Pikes Peak Area Council of Governments (PPACG) and the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT) on an annual basis.

Chief Safety Officer

The AE designates the Compliance & Safety Supervisor in Transit Services as MMT's Chief Safety Officer (CSO). The CSO has the following authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities under this plan:

- Developing and updating MMT's Agency Safety Plan (ASP) and Safety Management System (SMS) policies and procedures.
- Managing the agency-wide Employee Safety Reporting Program (ESRP).
- Identifying any substandard performance in MMT's SMS and developing action plans for approval by the AE.
- Administering the agency's Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) and coordinating with external agencies and internal departments during emergency situations and day-to-day safety matters.
- Provides Safety Risk Management (SRM) expertise and support for other MMT personnel who conduct and oversee Safety Assurance activities.
- Promoting the ASP by holding regular safety briefings with MMT staff and contractors.
- Ensuring agency policies are consistent with MMT's safety objectives.
- Advising the AE on SMS progress and status.

Leadership and Executive Management

MMT agency leadership and executive management, as well as contractor leadership, also have authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities for implementation and operation of MMT's SMS under this plan. MMT leadership and executive management include:

- Transit Manager (the AE)
- Transit Administrator
- Operations Supervisor
- Asset Supervisor
- Compliance & Safety Supervisor (the CSO)
- Senior Compliance Analyst
- Finance Supervisor

- Planning Supervisor
- Senior Procurement Analyst

Contractor leadership and management include:

- General Manager
- Assistant/Deputy Manager(s)
- Operations Manager(s)
- Safety Manager(s)
- Human Resource Manager(s)
- Supervisor(s)

All leadership personnel have the following authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities:

- Completing online “SMS Awareness” training offered by the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI).
- Attending regular safety briefings and promoting a culture of safety throughout the agency.
- Recommending modifications to policies and ensuring policies are implemented consistent with the SMS and contract provisions, as necessary.
- Overseeing personnel to ensure the successful implementation of the ASP and SMS.

Contract and Program Coordinators

Contract and Program Coordinators are responsible for direct oversight of their respective contractors and ensuring compliance not only with contract provisions, but also with MMT policies, procedures, and plans. Coordinators include:

- Fixed-Route Program Coordinator
- Civil Rights Administrator
- Vanpool Coordinator
- Fleet Program Coordinator
- Facilities Program Coordinator
- Project Design Specialist
- Senior PR & Marketing Specialist
- Planning Data Analyst

Contract and Program Coordinators have the following authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities:

- Overseeing day-to-day operations of the SMS during regular contract oversight.
- Coordinating with external agencies and internal departments in emergency situations and day-to-day safety matters.
- Providing subject matter expertise to support implementation of the SMS as requested by the AE or the CSO, including SRM activities, investigation of safety events, development of safety risk mitigations, and monitoring of mitigation effectiveness.

Key Staff

Key staff include employees of Mountain Metropolitan Transit and contractors.

MMT Key Staff

Key MMT staff, not previously covered under an above section, include:

- Customer Service Agents
- Compliance Technicians
- Transit Scheduler
- Grants Analyst
- Public communications Specialist
- Applications Support Administrators
- Contract Specialists
- Buyers
- Administrative Technicians
- Accounting Technicians
- TVM Maintenance Technician

Maintenance Contractor Key Staff

- Mechanics
- Utility Crew Members
- Administrative Staff

Service Contractor Key Staff

- Vehicle Operators
- Dispatchers
- Administrative Staff

All key staff have the following authorities, accountabilities, and responsibilities under this plan:

- Reporting unsafe or potentially unsafe conditions to the CSO, their supervisor and/or manager, or via the Employee Safety Reporting System as described in the following section.
- Carrying out daily duties in a safe and cautious manner and according to specified policies and procedures.

Employee Safety Reporting Program

MMT's Employee Safety Reporting Program (ESRP) encourages staff, regardless of employer, who identify safety concerns in their day-to-day duties to report them to MMT or their employer in good faith without fear of retribution. There are many ways employees can report safety conditions:

- All fixed-route bus AVL systems allow drivers to report safety issues through use of the Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs). The information is automatically sent via an email to the appropriate group responsible for the issue (i.e., fleet, facilities, operations).
- Fixed-route drivers or ADA Complementary paratransit drivers may report conditions directly to their respective dispatcher, who will add them to the daily Operations Log or email the MMT staff responsible for their contract oversight.

- Any employee may report conditions anonymously via a locked comment box in the driver areas of the fixed-route and ADA Complementary paratransit buildings or in the break room of the maintenance building. MMT staff has the only key to these boxes and checks them on at least a weekly basis.
- Any employee may report conditions using their name or anonymously to transitinfo@coloradosprings.gov or transitcompliance@coloradosprings.gov. Reports can also be made through an anonymous online form.
- Any employee may report conditions directly to any supervisor, manager, or director.

Examples of information that should be reported include:

- Safety concerns in the operating environment (i.e., county or city road conditions or the condition of facilities or vehicles)
- Policies and procedures that are not working as intended (i.e., pre- or post-trip inspection)
- Events that senior managers might not otherwise know about (i.e., near misses)
- Information about why a safety event occurred (i.e., radio communication challenges)

The CSO, or MMT designee, regularly reviews the following for potential safety risks:

- Dispatch daily Operations Log (fixed route)
- Any submitted Safety & Security reports
- Items from each contractor's safety meeting(s)
- Comments from each contractor's comment box
- Comments submitted via the email addresses listed above

The CSO, or designee, then documents any risks identified through the review process in the Safety Risk Register and will determine the most appropriate and timely course of action through MMT's SRM process to ensure identified hazards and associated consequences are appropriately identified and resolved. Additionally, if the reporting employee provided his or her name during the reporting process, the CSO or designee may follow up directly with the employee when MMT determines whether to act and/or after any mitigations are implemented. Any deficiencies or non-compliance with rules or procedures are managed through MMT's Safety Assurance process.

MMT encourages participation in the ESRP by protecting employees who report safety conditions in good faith. However, MMT may pursue disciplinary action or contractor staff removal if the report involves any of the following:

- Willful participation in illegal activity, such as assault or theft
- Gross negligence, such as knowingly utilizing heavy equipment for purposes other than intended such that people or property are put at risk
- Deliberate or willful disregard of regulations or procedures, such as reporting to work under the influence of controlled substances

The CSO discusses any actions taken to address reported safety conditions during monthly safety briefings with the Safety Committee.

Safety Committee Purpose and Structure

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law requires recipients of section 5307 funds that serve urbanized areas with populations of 200,000 or more to establish a Safety Committee, composed of equal representatives of frontline employees and management, that is responsible for identifying, recommending, and analyzing the effectiveness of risk-based mitigations or strategies to reduce consequences identified in the agency's safety risk assessment.

The Safety Committee in 2023 will be composed of MMT administration staff, contract management staff, and frontline workers, including:

- MMT Administration Representative
- Fixed-Route Contract Management Representative
- ADA Complementary Paratransit Contract Management Representative
- Maintenance Contract Management Representative
- Four (4) frontline workers

The Safety Committee will meet monthly to review the Risk Register and:

- Identify and recommend risk-based mitigations or strategies necessary to reduce the likelihood and severity of consequences identified through the agency's safety risk assessment,
- Identify mitigations or strategies that may be ineffective, inappropriate, or were not implemented as intended, and
- Identify safety deficiencies for purposes of continuing improvement.

The Committee may also identify and analyze trends across service modes or flag certain assets as safety concerns to be addressed by its Transit Asset Management (TAM) program. Where additional mitigations are warranted, the Safety Committee will identify and program adequate resources to reduce risk. Special meetings of the Safety Committee may also be convened if necessary.

Topics discussed at the Safety Committee meetings may be presented at other safety meetings, posted on bulletin boards throughout the Transit Campus, or disseminated via handout for additional personnel review and comment.

The Safety Committee will create and maintain bylaws and procedures for its meetings and duties as a separate document.

Safety Risk Management Process

MMT requires all its contractors to use the SRM process described in this plan as a primary method to ensure the safety of operations, passengers, employees, vehicles, and facilities. The process identifies hazards and their consequences, assesses each hazard for potential risks, and mitigates those risks in a timely manner acceptable to MMT's leadership.

MMT's SRM process allows for careful examination of potential hazards and their mitigations to determine whether sufficient precautions have been taken or if further mitigations are necessary. The

results of MMT's SRM process are documented and made available to MMT staff and contractors via MMT's SharePoint system.

The CSO, MMT Program Coordinators, and the Safety Committee routinely review safety data captured in employee safety reports, safety meeting minutes, customer complaints, and other safety communication channels. When appropriate, the CSO, or designee, ensures that the concerns are investigated or analyzed through MMT's SRM process.

The CSO, MMT Program Coordinators, and the Safety Committee also review internal and external reviews, including audits and assessments, with findings concerning MMT's safety performance, compliance with operations and maintenance procedures, or the effectiveness of safety risk mitigations.

MMT's SRM process applies to all elements of the transit system including service operations and maintenance; facilities and vehicles; and personnel recruitment, training, and supervision.

In carrying out the SRM process, MMT uses the following terms:

- Event – Any accident, incident, or occurrence as defined by 49 CFR 673.5
- Hazard – Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death; damage to or loss of the facilities, equipment, rolling stock, or infrastructure belonging to MMT; or damage to the environment
- Risk – Composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard
- Risk Mitigation – Method(s) to eliminate or reduce the effects of hazards
- Consequence – An effect of a hazard involving injury, illness, death, or damage to MMT property or the environment

Safety Hazard Identification

The safety hazard identification process offers MMT the ability to identify hazards and potential consequences in the operation and maintenance of the MMT system. Hazards may be identified through a variety of sources, including:

- Vehicle camera footage
- Events and incident reports in the TransitMaster operations system
- Observations from supervisors, drivers, customers, passengers, third parties, etc.
- Observations from Program Compliance staff
- Vehicle maintenance reports or Daily Vehicle Inspection Reports (DVIRs)
- Regular vehicle and/or facility inspections
- Events reported through MMT's Safety & Security reports
- Regular review of safety events
- Review of monthly performance data and safety performance targets
- Results of training assessments
- Investigations into safety events, incidents, and occurrences
- Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and other oversight authorities (mandatory information source)

When a safety concern is identified, the CSO must be made aware. The CSO, or designee, will enter any hazards related to the safety issue into the Safety Risk Register (SRR) and then be responsible for determining the timeline for engaging the rest of the risk management process. Procedures for reporting hazards are reviewed during monthly safety briefings and posted on bulletin boards in facilities within the Transit Campus.

The CSO or designee may conduct further analyses of hazards and consequences in the SRR to collect additional information, identify additional consequences, and/or to decide which hazards should be prioritized for safety risk assessment. In following up on identified hazards, MMT's CSO may:

- Reach out to the reporting party, if available, to gather all known information about the reported hazard.
- Conduct a walkthrough of the affected area, assessing the possible hazardous condition, generating visual documentation (photographs and/or video), and taking any measurements deemed necessary.
- Conduct interviews with employees in the area to gather potentially relevant information on the reported hazard.
- Review any documentation associated with the hazard (records, reports, procedures, inspections, technical documents, etc.).
- Contact other departments that may have association with or technical knowledge relevant to the reported hazard.
- Review any past reported hazards of a similar nature.
- Evaluate tasks and/or processes associated with the reported hazard.

Investigations will be documented in memorandum format and sent to the AE. The CSO will brief the AE on safety items at regular meetings to occur at least quarterly.

Any identified hazard that the CSO believes poses a real and immediate threat to life, property, or the environment² will immediately be brought to the attention of the AE and addressed through the SRM process for safety risk assessment and mitigation.

Safety Risk Assessment

Once hazards are identified, the CSO determines the safety risk by assessing the likelihood and severity of the consequences of hazards, including any existing mitigations. These assessments are then reviewed by the Safety Committee.

The Safety Committee assesses prioritized hazards as defined in the Safety Risk Matrix and provided by the FTA and shown below. This matrix expresses assessed risk as a combination of one severity category and one likelihood level, also referred to as a hazard rating. For example, a risk may be assessed as "1A" or the combination of a Catastrophic (1) severity category and a Frequent (A) probability level.

² Environmental threats include those that would constitute a violation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or Colorado environmental standards.

Risk Assessment Matrix				
Likelihood	Severity			
	1 (Catastrophic)	2 (Critical)	3 (Marginal)	4 (Negligible)
A (Frequent)	1A	2A	3A	4A
B (Probable)	1B	2B	3B	4B
C (Occasional)	1C	2C	3C	4C
D (Remote)	1D	2D	3D	4D
E (Improbable)	1E	2E	3E	4E

Risk Assessment Matrix Color Code	
<i>"Tolerability" based on identified severity and likelihood.</i>	
HIGH	Unacceptable under the existing circumstances.
MEDIUM	Acceptable based upon mitigations.
LOW	Acceptable with senior management approval.

This matrix also categorizes combined risks into levels, High, Medium, or Low, based on the likelihood of occurrence and severity of the outcome. For purposes of accepting risk:

- "High" hazard ratings will be considered unacceptable and require action from MMT to mitigate the safety risk.
- "Medium" hazard ratings will be considered undesirable and require MMT's Safety Committee to decide whether they are acceptable.
- "Low" hazard ratings may be accepted by the CSO without additional review.

Using a categorization of High, Medium, or Low allows for hazards to be prioritized for mitigation based on their associated safety risk.

The CSO schedules safety risk assessment activities for the proper Committee meeting and prepares a Safety Risk Assessment Package. This package is distributed in advance of any meeting. During the meeting, the CSO reviews the hazard, its consequence(s), and the available information distributed in the Safety Risk Assessment Package regarding severity and likelihood. The CSO may request support from members of the Committee in obtaining additional information to support the safety risk assessment.

Once sufficient information has been obtained, the CSO will facilitate completion of relevant sections of the Safety Risk Register, using the MMT Safety Risk Assessment Matrix, with the Safety Committee. The CSO or designee will update the safety risk assessment, including hazard rating and mitigation options for each assessed safety hazard, based on the group's consensus. The CSO will maintain on file Safety Committee agendas, Safety Risk Assessment Packages, additional information collection, and completed Safety Risk Register sections for a period of three years from the date of generation.

Safety Risk Mitigation

MMT's AE and CSO review current methods of safety risk mitigation and establish methods or procedures to mitigate or eliminate safety risk associated with specific hazards based on recommendations from the Safety Committee. MMT can reduce safety risk by reducing the likelihood and/or severity of potential consequences of hazards.

Prioritization of safety risk mitigations is based on the results of safety risk assessments. MMT's CSO tracks and updates safety risk mitigation information in the Safety Risk Register and makes the Register available to the Safety Committee during monthly meetings and to MMT staff upon request.

In the Safety Risk Register, MMT's CSO will also document any specific measures or activities, such as reviews, observations, or audits, that will be conducted to monitor the effectiveness of mitigations once implemented.

Safety Assurance

Through the Safety Assurance process, MMT:

- Evaluates its compliance with operations and maintenance procedures to determine whether MMT's existing rules and procedures are sufficient to control our safety risk.
- Assesses the effectiveness of safety risk mitigations to make sure the mitigations are appropriate and are implemented as intended.
- Investigates safety events to identify causal factors.
- Analyzes information from safety reporting, including data about safety failures, defects, or conditions.

Safety Performance Monitoring and Measurement

MMT relies on several processes to monitor its entire transit system for compliance with operations and maintenance procedures, including:

- Operational software,
- Safety audits,
- Informal inspections,
- Regular review of onboard camera footage to assess drivers and specific incidents,
- Safety surveys,
- The ESRP,
- Investigation of safety events,
- Safety review prior to the launch or modification of any facet of service,
- Daily data gathering and monitoring of data related to the delivery of service, and
- Regular vehicle inspections and preventative maintenance.

Results from the above processes are compared against recent performance trends quarterly and annually by the CSO to determine where action needs to be taken. The CSO or designee enters any identified non-compliant or ineffective activities, including mitigations, back into the SRM process for reevaluation by the Safety Committee.

MMT monitors safety risk mitigations to determine if they have been implemented and are effective, appropriate, and working as intended. The CSO or designee maintains a list of safety risk mitigations in the Safety Risk Register. The mechanism for monitoring safety risk mitigations varies depending on the mitigation.

The CSO establishes one or more mechanisms for monitoring safety risk mitigations as part of the mitigation implementation process and assigns monitoring activities to the appropriate director, manager, or supervisor. These monitoring mechanisms may include tracking a specific metric on daily, weekly, or monthly logs or reports; conducting job performance observations; or other activities. The CSO will endeavor to make use of existing MMT processes and activities before assigning new information collection activities.

MMT's CSO and Safety Committee review the performance of individual safety risk mitigations during monthly Safety Committee meetings and based on the reporting schedule determined for each mitigation, determine if a specific safety risk mitigation is not implemented or not performing as intended. If the mitigation is not implemented or performing as intended, the Safety Committee will propose a course of action to modify the mitigation or take other action to manage the safety risk. The CSO will approve or modify this proposed course of action and oversee its execution.

MMT's CSO and Safety Committee also monitor MMT's operations on a large scale to identify mitigations that may be ineffective, inappropriate, or not implemented as intended by:

- Reviewing results from accident, incident, and occurrence investigations,
- Monitoring employee safety reporting,
- Monitoring industry best practices and other safety-related information,
- Reviewing results of internal safety audits and inspections, and
- Analyzing operational and safety data to identify emerging safety concerns.

The CSO works with the Safety Committee and AE to carry out and document all monitoring activities.

MMT meets with contractors on either weekly or monthly to review safety events and determine causal and contributing factors. Events reviewed during these meetings are documented on a spreadsheet and summarized monthly. Additional investigation either preceding or following these regular meetings may also be completed. If additional investigation is done, a formal investigation memo will be prepared and presented to the Safety Committee at the next monthly meeting.

The CSO maintains all documentation of MMT's investigation policies, processes, forms, checklists, activities, and results.

Safety Risk-Reduction Program

Through its Safety Performance Monitoring and Measurement process, MMT tracks safety trends and can identify areas or issues that may require additional scrutiny or mitigation to reduce safety risks. MMT reviews all data, even though it may not meet the reporting threshold to the National Transit Database (NTD). By reviewing data and taking appropriate action, MMT strives to reduce its number and rate of vehicular and pedestrian accidents, injuries, and transit worker assaults. Individual risks are mitigated through MMT's Safety Risk Mitigation and Safety Assurance processes.

MMT has reported the following number data to NTD on an annual basis. Data was derived using a three-year average from 2020 through 2022.

Average Reports (2020-2022)					
S&S-40 Data (Major)					
Reportable Event Data	Fixed Route	Vanpool	ADA Complementary Paratransit	Taxi Choice	Total
Total Events Reported	8	0	1	0	9
Total Injuries Reported	3	1	0	0	4
Total Fatalities Reported	0	0	0	0	0

Average Reports (2020-2022)					
S&S-50 Data (Non-Major)					
Reportable Event Data	Fixed Route	Vanpool	ADA Complementary Paratransit	Taxi Choice	Total
Total Non-Major Fire Incidents	0	0	0	0	0
Total Non-Major Other Safety Incidents	5	0	1	0	6
Total Non-Major Incident Injuries	5	0	1	0	6

Similar to the Annual Safety Targets at the beginning of the plan, MMT strives for at least a 10% reduction in its NTD reporting data. The 2023 Risk Reduction targets are as follows:

Target Reports (2023)					
S&S-40 Data (Major)					
Reportable Event Data	Fixed Route	Vanpool	ADA Complementary Paratransit	Taxi Choice	Total
Total Events Reported	7	0	0	0	7
Total Injuries Reported	2	0	0	0	2
Total Fatalities Reported	0	0	0	0	0

Target Reports (2023)					
S&S-50 Data (Non-Major)					
Reportable Event Data	Fixed Route	Vanpool	ADA Complementary Paratransit	Taxi Choice	Total
Total Non-Major Fire Incidents	0	0	0	0	0
Total Non-Major Other Safety Incidents	4	0	0	0	5
Total Non-Major Incident Injuries	4	0	0	0	5

Additionally, MMT allocates no less than 0.75% of its 5307 funding to safety-related projects.

Safety Promotion

MMT requires a comprehensive safety training program that applies to all employees directly responsible for safety, including:

- Vehicle operators,
- Dispatchers,
- Maintenance technicians,
- Managers and supervisors,
- Agency Leadership and Executive Management,
- The Chief Safety Officer, and
- The Accountable Executive.

MMT requires service contractors to dedicate resources to conduct a comprehensive safety training program, as well as training on SMS roles and responsibilities. The scope of the safety training, including annual refresher training, is appropriate to each employee's individual safety-related job responsibilities and their role in the SMS.

Basic training requirements for contract employees, including frequencies and refresher training, are reviewed and approved annually by MMT.

MMT will ensure all contractors have a Safety Management Plan that includes at a minimum the following:

Operations safety-related skill training

- New-hire bus vehicle operator classroom and hands-on skill training
- Bus vehicle operator refresher training
- Bus vehicle operator retraining (recertification or return to work)
- De-escalation training
- Classroom and on-the-job training for dispatchers
- Classroom and on-the-job training for operations supervisors and managers
- Accident investigation training for operations supervisors and managers

Vehicle maintenance safety-related skill training

- Ongoing vehicle maintenance technician skill training
- Ongoing skill training for vehicle maintenance supervisors
- Accident investigation training for vehicle maintenance supervisors
- De-escalation training
- Ongoing hazardous material training for vehicle maintenance technicians and supervisors
- Training provided by vendors

MMT's Leadership and Executive Management staff, as well as its Contract and Program Coordinators, must, at a minimum, complete FTA's SMS Awareness online training on safety management offered through the Transportation Safety Institute. Additional training may be required throughout the year, as necessary.

MMT's CSO and service contractors' Directors of Human Resources and Training coordinate safety communication activities for the SMS. Service contractors' activities require focus on the three categories of communication activity established in 49 CFR Part 673 (Part 673):

Communicating safety and safety performance information throughout the agency. Service Contractors communicate information on safety and safety performance quarterly and during All-Staff Meetings. MMT also may place an agenda item in any monthly Drivers' Meetings dedicated to safety. Information typically conveyed during these meetings includes safety performance statistics, lessons learned from recent occurrences, upcoming events that may impact MMT's service or safety performance, and updates regarding SMS implementation. MMT also requests information from drivers during these meetings, which is recorded in meeting minutes. Finally, Service contractors' Director of Human Resources and Training posts safety bulletins and flyers on the bulletin boards located in all bus operator and maintenance technician break rooms, advertising safety messages and promoting awareness of safety issues. This process will be audited by the CSO or their designee.

Communicating information on hazards and safety risks relevant to employees' roles and responsibilities throughout the agency. As part of new-hire training, Service Contractors are required to distribute safety policies and procedures, included in the MMT Operations PPM, to all employees. MMT requires contractors to provide training on these policies and procedures and discusses them during safety talks between supervisors and bus operators and vehicle technicians. For newly emerging issues or safety events at the agency, MMT's CSO issues bulletins or messages to employees that are reinforced by supervisors in one-on-one or group discussions with employees.

Informing employees of safety actions taken in response to reports submitted through the ESRP. MMT provides targeted communications to inform employees of safety actions taken in response to reports submitted through the ESRP, including handouts and flyers, safety talks, updates to bulletin boards, and one-on-one discussions between employees and supervisors.

MMT will maintain documentation related to the implementation of its SMS; the programs, policies, and procedures used to carry out this ASP; and the results from its SMS processes and activities for three years after creation. They will be available to the FTA or other Federal or oversight entity upon request.

Glossary

Accident

Any event involving a transit vehicle or taking place on a transit-controlled property where one or more of the following occurs: a loss of life; a report of a serious injury to a person; a collision of public transit vehicles; a runaway train; an evacuation for life safety reasons; or any derailment of a rail transit vehicle, at any location, at any time, whatever the cause.

Accountable Executive

A single, identifiable person who has ultimate responsibility for carrying out the Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan of a public transportation agency; responsibility for carrying out the agency's Transit Asset Management Plan; and control or direction over the capital resources needed to develop and maintain both the agency's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329(d), and the agency's Transit Asset Management Plan in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5326.

Chief Safety Officer

Chief Safety Officer means an adequately trained individual who has responsibility for safety and reports directly to a transit agency's chief executive officer, general manager, president, or equivalent officer. A Chief Safety Officer may not serve in other operational or maintenance capacities, unless the Chief Safety Officer is employed by a transit agency that is a small public transportation provider as defined in this part, or a public transportation provider that does not operate a rail fixed guideway public transportation system.

Equivalent Authority

An entity that carries out duties similar to that of a Board of Directors, for a recipient or subrecipient of FTA funds under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53, including sufficient authority to review and approve a recipient or subrecipient's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan.

Event

Any Accident, Incident, or Occurrence.

FTA

Federal Transit Administration, an operating administration within the United States Department of Transportation.

Hazard

Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death; damage to or loss of the facilities, equipment, rolling stock, or infrastructure of a public transportation system; or damage to the environment.

Incident

An event that involves any of the following: a personal injury that is not a serious injury; one or more injuries requiring medical transport; or damage to facilities, equipment, rolling stock, or infrastructure that disrupts the operations of a transit agency.

Investigation	The process of determining the causal and contributing factors of an accident, incident, or hazard, for the purpose of preventing recurrence and mitigating risk.
National Public Transportation Safety Plan	The plan to improve the safety of all public transportation systems that receive Federal financial assistance under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53.
Occurrence	An Event without any personal injury in which any damage to facilities, equipment, rolling stock, or infrastructure does not disrupt the operations of a transit agency.
Operator of a Public Transportation System	A provider of public transportation as defined under 49 U.S.C. 5302 (14).
Performance Measure	An expression based on a quantifiable indicator of performance or condition that is used to establish targets and to assess progress toward meeting the established targets.
Performance Target	A quantifiable level of performance or condition, expressed as a value for the measure, to be achieved within a time period required by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan	The documented comprehensive agency safety plan for a transit agency that is required by 49 U.S.C. 5329 and this part.
Risk	The composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard.
Risk Mitigation	A method or methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of hazards.
Safety Assurance	Processes within a transit agency's Safety Management System that function to ensure the implementation and effectiveness of safety risk mitigation, and to ensure that the transit agency meets or exceeds its safety objectives through the collection, analysis, and assessment of information.
Safety Management Policy	A transit agency's documented commitment to safety, which defines the transit agency's safety objectives and the accountabilities and responsibilities of its employees in regards to safety.
Safety Management System (SMS)	the formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of a transit agency's safety risk mitigation. SMS includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for managing risks and hazards.

Safety Management System (SMS) Executive	a Chief Safety Officer or an equivalent.
Safety Performance Target	a Performance Target related to safety management activities.
Safety Promotion	a combination of training and communication of safety information to support SMS as applied to the transit agency's public transportation system.
Safety Risk Assessment	the formal activity whereby a transit agency determines Safety Risk Management priorities by establishing the significance or value of its safety risks.
Safety Risk Management	a process within a transit agency's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan for identifying hazards and analyzing, assessing, and mitigating safety risk.
Serious Injury	means any injury which (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or noses); (3) causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or (5) involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.
Small Public Transportation Provider	a recipient or subrecipient of Federal financial assistance under 49 U.S.C. 5307 that has one hundred (100) or fewer vehicles in peak revenue service and does not operate a rail fixed guideway public transportation system.
State of Good Repair	the condition in which a capital asset is able to operate at a full level of performance.
Transit Asset Management Plan	the strategic and systematic practice of procuring, operating, inspecting, maintaining, rehabilitating, and replacing transit capital assets to manage their performance, risks, and costs over their life cycles, for the purpose of providing safe, cost-effective, and reliable public transportation, as required by 49 U.S.C. 5326 and 49 CFR part 625.






Safety Plan Update 2023 - SC Approved

Final Audit Report

2023-06-27

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Mountain Metropolitan Transit Safety Committee Agenda

Tuesday, June 20, 2023

2:00 p.m.

Transit Administration Building, Medium Conference Room

Ms. Erin McCauley, Safety & Compliance Supervisor for Mountain Metropolitan Transit (MMT), called the meeting to order at 2:11 p.m. She began a recording of the meeting.

I. Member Introductions & Committee Background

Ms. McCauley explained that since the Committee did not yet have approved bylaws, the group would follow the agenda sent out prior to the meeting.

Attendees included:

- Erin McCauley, Safety & Compliance Supervisor at MMT (Management Representative)
- Sal Pozos, Assistant General Manager at Transdev for Metro Mobility and fixed-route service (Management Representative)
- Byron Bryant, General Manager at Transdev for fixed-route service (Management Representative)
- Noah Harper, Recording Secretary for the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) Local 19, guest
- Sharon Clements, Financial Secretary for the ATU Local 19 (and frontline worker representative)
- Margie Sullivant, President for the ATU Local 19 (and frontline worker representative)
- Art Aguilar, International Vice President of the ATU, guest

After introductions, two additional participants arrived:

- Matt Heafner, General Manager at Transdev for Metro Mobility (Management Representative)
- Richard VanWinkle, General Manager at Transdev for Maintenance (Management Representative)

Ms. McCauley noted that the Committee numbers were unequal. Mr. Sal Pozos left the meeting and Mr. Matt Heafner agreed not to participate. Ms. Sullivant asked Ms. Clements to call Kelly Muirheid to serve as another frontline representative; Ms. Clements called and Ms. Muirheid agreed to come to the meeting. Until Ms. Muirheid's arrival, the Committee consisted of three (3) Management Representatives (Mr. Bryant, Mr. VanWinkle, and Ms. McCauley) and three (3) frontline worker representatives (Mr. Harper, Ms. Clements, and Ms. Sullivant). Mr. Heafner and Mr. Aguilar attended as guests.

II. Safety Committee Bylaws/Rules of Order

Ms. McCauley explained that the Committee would need to agree on bylaws. She introduced a handout (Exhibit A) of Robert's Rules of Order as a starting point. Ms. Sullivant said she was familiar with Robert's Rules of Order.

Ms. McCauley asked the group whether it preferred strict rules of order or whether the rules should be relaxed. Ms. Sullivant said she was comfortable speaking up and giving other people a chance to speak. She thought limiting people's time to speak would not be helpful.

Ms. McCauley asked if the Safety Committee should have a Chair. Ms. Sullivant suggested the Committee have co-chairs. Ms. McCauley asked how the co-chair structure would work – would both chairs run the meeting? Can one call a meeting? Do they have to agree to call a meeting? Ms. Sullivant asked if Ms. McCauley was talking about calling special meetings in addition to the monthly meetings already provided for in the draft Safety Plan. Ms. McCauley replied yes. Ms. McCauley also referred to the handout and noted the Chair is supposed to ensure the meeting runs smoothly. She suggested the co-chairs could take turns running meetings every other month. Ms. Sullivant and Ms. Clements agreed alternating chair functions could work. Ms. McCauley said that both chairs would attend each meeting, though.

Ms. McCauley asked the group how they wanted agendas to be prepared. She suggested that since MMT agreed to take on preparing the minutes, MMT could also prepare an agenda and send it to the co-chairs for approval a week prior to the meeting to see if they want to add something. Ms. Sullivant and Mr. Bryant agreed. Ms. Sullivant suggested the committee members reach out to Ms. McCauley during the month to add items. Ms. McCauley said the agenda could have recurring items that the Committee knows need to be discussed. Ms. Sullivant agreed. Ms. McCauley then asked if the agenda should be approved by the co-chairs or just sent out to the Committee members. Ms. Sullivant thought it would be fine to send the agenda out to all Committee members a week prior to the meeting. Ms. McCauley noted the Committee could always approve the order of the agenda at the meeting or shuffle items around, as needed.

Ms. McCauley asked about recurring items. She thought the Risk Register might be one item. Ms. Sullivant liked the idea and suggested the previous month's incidents would also be good to review.

Ms. McCauley asked whether there needs to be a quorum to start meetings. She explained that usually, a quorum is a majority (half plus one), but that in this case, the Committee needs to be comprised of equal numbers Management and Frontline representatives. Ms. Sullivant asked if this related to Committee voting; Ms. McCauley replied that it did. She explained that a quorum for this Committee would likely be four (4) representatives – two (2) from the Management side and two (2) from the Frontline Workers.

Ms. Sullivant explained that they had planned to have alternates attend meetings on the Frontline Worker side. Ms. Sullivant explained that if the Committee changed, the Alternate(s) could step in as they knew what had occurred. Ms. McCauley asked the Committee if there should be alternates. Mr. Bryant said he had no issues with alternates, but that the meeting minutes could also serve to educate Alternates without them having to attend each meeting.

Ms. Kelly Muirheid, Frontline representative, arrived at 2:25 p.m. Mr. Heafner was then allowed to participate as a Management representative.

Ms. McCauley asked if there should be a limit to the number of Alternates. Ms. Sullivant said she would be fine with up to two per side. There was general consensus amongst the group. Ms. Sullivant noted the Committee still needed to decide on the quorum.

Ms. Sullivant said she did not see a difference between two (2) [Frontline representatives] and two (2) [Management representatives] and four (4) [Frontline representatives] and four (4) [Management representatives]. Ms. McCauley said the quorum is to establish a minimum participation in order to make a decision. The group agreed to a minimum of two (2) representatives from the Frontline and Management sides but ensuring equal participation from each side.

Ms. McCauley asked if the Committee should just adopt Robert's Rules of Order. There was consensus. She said she would write up what was discussed and that the Committee could vote on the rules formally at the next meeting.

III. PTASP Update

Recommendation: Approve

Ms. McCauley referred to the draft Safety Plan emailed to the Committee (Exhibit B) and provided a general background of the updates, noting the most significant was the makeup of the Safety Committee. The Plan provides for monthly Safety Committee meetings. Ms. Sullivant asked what "Taxi Choice" is. Mr. Heafner explained that it is a program that ADA paratransit riders can choose to take a taxi instead of a Metro Mobility van. Ms. Sullivant asked whether Taxi Choice takes away from paratransit. Mr. Heafner explained there are not a lot of trips. Ms. McCauley explained also that the rides are restricted to seven (7) miles in length. Ms. McCauley asked Mr. Heafner if it is offered or if riders have to specifically ask; Mr. Heafner replied they have to ask. Ms. Muirheid said her grandmother used to use that service. Mr. Heafner explained there is also a taxi overflow program; Ms. McCauley explained that ADA Complementary Paratransit service is No Denial, so when all vehicles are in use, taxis are able to provide the extra rides.

Ms. Sullivant asked who would have access to the anonymous reporting form. Ms. McCauley explained the form had not been built yet. She believed the form can be set to identify a certain user or users. Ms. Sullivant asked how the Committee would know if there were any anonymous reports. Ms. McCauley said the form goes into the City's system and anything within that system is able to be requested under the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA).

Ms. Sullivant noted the plan says that the Trapeze terminals (AVLs) allow drivers to report safety issues, but said the terminals do not actually allow that. She said dispatchers can send drivers a message and they can respond, "yes" or "no." Ms. McCauley said there are options in the menu and submenus. Ms. Sullivant said the terminals don't allow them to type anything in or report. Ms. McCauley asked if there were other options the drivers would like to see on the menu; Ms. Sullivant said she would rather get rid of the AVLs altogether and feels they are like a phone and should not be used. Ms. McCauley said the reports should be sent when the vehicles are stopped and agreed with Ms. Sullivant that they should not be used while driving. Ms. Sullivant said that drivers sometimes receive calls from dispatchers asking if they have received their messages and feel pressured to check them when the bus is in motion. Ms. McCauley said there are options, like "pothole," etc. that can be used.

Ms. Sharon Clements asked if using the terminals could be added to a monthly training so that drivers know what their options are. Ms. Muirheid added that not all the AVLs work – that 1904, 2200s, etc. Ms. McCauley asked if drivers were writing up AVL problems; Ms. Muirheid said they

were told not to write them up on the Driver Vehicle Inspection Reports (DVIRs) but that sometimes they call them into dispatch. Ms. McCauley said MMT is having issues with being able to hold buses for its Information Technology (IT) staff to work on. Mr. Richard VanWinkle said that he forwards any DVIRs with AVL notes onto MMT's IT group. Ms. Muirheid said their dispatchers have told them not to write such things on the DVIRs. Mr. Bryant took a note.

Ms. Sullivant asked Mr. Noah Harper what question they had about training. Mr. Harper said the plan has a statement that reads, "MMT also has a permanent agenda item in all monthly Drivers' Meetings dedicated to safety" (page 17). Ms. McCauley explained that the meetings referred to are the contractor's meetings. MMT project managers speak with contract managers and if there is a hot-button item, MMT asks the contractor to cover the topic. Ms. Sullivant said the statement reads as though this is done every month, but states it is not. She said they do not want their drivers being held accountable for things that are not done. Ms. McCauley suggested revising the statement to, "MMT also *may* [emphasis added] place agenda items...." The group agreed.

Ms. Sullivant asked if she could receive a list of the names and contact details for the project/program managers listed in the plan. Ms. McCauley said she would share the phone list.

Ms. McCauley asked if there were any other questions or concerns with the plan. Ms. Sullivant said she was comfortable with the changes that were made. Ms. McCauley said she would entertain a motion for approval.

Ms. Sullivant suggested the plan should also be updated to include that the co-chairs should be the recipients of any online anonymous safety reports. Ms. McCauley explained that recipients may be required to have a City email address and suggested she could print out the reports on a monthly basis and send them to the Committee. Ms. Sullivant said that the concern is that things would be deleted or lost or would disappear. Ms. McCauley explained that the form she was envisioning would be through the City's GoCOS! application and that the GoCOS! data is administered by a different department in the City. She explained that there is no way for Transit to delete or modify the records. Ms. McCauley suggested the plan remain as-is. Ms. Sullivant agreed.

Ms. Clements motioned to approve the updated draft of MMT's Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) with the modified language on page 17. Mr. Heafner seconded the motion. ***The motion passed 7-1 with Mr. Harper dissenting.***

IV. Safety Risk Register

Ms. McCauley explained that the PTASP mentions a Safety Risk Register (SRR). She said MMT has always had the SRR, but has not put it before this Committee. She showed the SRR via projector (Exhibit C) and said she wanted to show the Committee what had been included and see if additional mitigations needed to be made for some of the issues.

One of the first items included on the SRR, Ms. McCauley explained, was lifting of the truncated domes at the Terminal. She went through each column and explained the contents of each and asked if the Committee required changes. Ms. Muirheid asked how recently the domes had been addressed with epoxy. Ms. McCauley thought the modifications had occurred last fall. Ms. Muirheid said she would look at them the next day but thought she had noticed them sticking up again. Mr.

Harper added that the cones had been there recently, too. Ms. McCauley said she would ask MMT's Facilities group and update the group at the next meeting.

Ms. McCauley then explained the next risk, which was close parking at the northern fence of the storage yard and asked the Committee for updates. Ms. Muirheid said the closeness of the buses is still difficult to maneuver around, especially during pre-trip inspections. Ms. Muirheid asked if it would be possible to park on Transit Drive. Ms. McCauley said she did not know but would look into the matter. Ms. Sullivant added that if a pre-trip was done on Transit Drive with cars and pedestrians nearby, it would be a worse safety issue. The group agreed.

Ms. McCauley added that the new building was powered up the previous week and had water. Ms. Sullivant said she had heard the roof was leaking; Ms. McCauley said it had been but that the contractor was addressing the issue. Mr. VanWinkle noted that when the building is complete, the parking issue will change. Ms. McCauley agreed and noted that pre-trip procedures would need to be developed. Ms. Sullivant said she had an issue with the ventilation in the bus garage. Ms. McCauley explained the building had been designed with enough ventilation to address the fumes. Ms. Muirheid asked if there is enough space to pre-trip a bus down at the garage. Ms. Sullivant suggested drivers could drive up to the Canopy and pre-trip their vehicles there. Mr. Heafner suggested they revisit the issue once the operation moves down to the new building. Ms. Sullivant asked if there would be tire stops; Mr. Heafner said the wheel chocks are a Transdev requirement. Ms. McCauley said she would pass this issue onto MMT's Operations Supervisor (Jacob Matsen) and MMT's Fleet Coordinator (Nate Yuhas).

Ms. McCauley returned to the SRR and explained the third hazard: improper judgment of distance and rear pivot point of vehicle. She explained the hazard had been identified through safety reviews and said the group saw drivers turning too sharply. The turns resulted in curbed tires and mirror strikes.

The fourth hazard, speed, Ms. McCauley noted had resulted from other safety reviews and noted the group had identified additional training as a mitigation. Ms. McCauley moved to the fifth hazard on the spreadsheet – driver inattention or distracted driving. She explained that the previous fixed-route contractor installed red dots on mirrors to catch drivers' attention to ensure they kept focused. The sixth hazard, the left-turn lane from westbound E. Fillmore Street onto southbound N. Nevada Avenue, Ms. McCauley said she had discussed with the City's Traffic Engineer and that the lane would be restriped in conjunction with the next project. Ms. Sullivant shared that she had had another vehicle take off a bus mirror when she was in that lane at one point.

Ms. McCauley explained that the seventh hazard, "stops too close to driveways," had to do with the change in curb height appearing to trick drivers' perception. After the driveways, they seemed to angle toward the curb more than they needed to.

Ms. Sullivant asked whether the Safety Event Reviews noted in the SRR were done via video or if staff goes out and looks at the site. Ms. McCauley said the video is reviewed first and then staff determines if a site visit is needed. Ms. Sullivant asked if someone from the Safety Committee could be involved in future site visits; Ms. McCauley said she would reach out when there are stops to review. Ms. Muirheid suggested stops near apartment driveways could be reviewed and Ms.

Sullivant noted a stop at Bijou that was a problem; Ms. McCauley asked for a list of areas that are concerning.

Ms. McCauley addressed the eighth hazard, construction zones, that had resulted in numerous curbed tires all around the service area. She shared one construction zone at W. Colorado Avenue and Sahwatch Street had claimed two tires in a row because the cones were not properly positioned. She noted that mitigations included additional driver training at safety meetings and procedures to have drivers call into dispatch to request a supervisor before attempting narrow areas. Ms. Muirheid offered to bring the issue up in an upcoming Union meeting.

Ms. McCauley noted the reviews saw a bit of drowsy driving but that drivers did not appear to have an overly long shift. Ms. Sullivant asked whether Ms. McCauley was referring to the shift on which the drowsiness occurred or the previous shift. Ms. McCauley responded that the group looked at both shifts. She said the drowsiness could have resulted from something in the driver's personal life. Mitigations included additional drowsy-driving awareness training.

Ms. McCauley noted the twelfth hazard – low-hanging tree branches – is an item she believed was available on the driver's mobile data terminal (AVL) to report. Ms. Sullivant confirmed. Ms. Muirheid said the tree branches are everywhere.

Ms. McCauley explained the thirteenth hazard resulted from paratransit drivers reporting that the nozzle at the unleaded fuel tanks had been spitting gasoline in high temperature conditions. She said MMT had installed a canopy over the tanks to mitigate the issue and would monitor the problem through this summer's hot days to ensure no additional mitigations were needed. Ms. Sullivant noted the fixed-route drivers use the same fuel pumps to fill their relief vans.

Ms. McCauley asked Mr. Heafner whether the gates at the 1165 Transit Drive facility were still malfunctioning. Mr. Heafner replied that the parts had been ordered.

The sixteenth item, "snow/ice," Ms. McCauley noted had been covered already. The seventeenth item related to paratransit services and loading large wheelchairs into the smaller cutaway vehicles used by Metro Mobility. She explained mitigations included ensuring the clients were assigned to the right vehicles.

Regarding infectious diseases, Ms. McCauley explained that the hazard came to the forefront with the COVID pandemic. She noted that infectious diseases are not limited to COVID and noted that sharps containers are provided at the Terminal. She said there have not been issues since the restrooms have been closed. Ms. Muirheid noted the Terminal staff has relocated to a van to use as an office and enquired whether a temporary office or guard shack could be located at the Terminal. Ms. Sullivant asked what the status of the restrooms was; Ms. McCauley replied that MMT is currently evaluating proposals. Ms. Sullivant noted that MMT was evaluating last month. Ms. McCauley said the procurement process sometimes takes a little time.

Ms. Sullivant asked if there was a target date for reopening. Ms. McCauley said she thought sometime in September. Ms. Sullivant asked what was being done in the meantime – where do drivers and Terminal staff go to use the restrooms? Ms. McCauley said that drivers should use City Hall. Mr. Bryant said he has heard from drivers that the security guards do not have the proper access or key codes. Ms. McCauley said she provided a list from the security contractor of personnel

assigned to the Terminal to the City department responsible for City Hall access and that access had been given. Ms. Sullivant said that they do not have access. Mr. Harper added that security guards have told drivers to go to the hotel nearby. Ms. Muirheid asked if the hotel has been compensated. She also asked how drivers whose routes do not go to the Terminal are supposed to use the restrooms. Ms. Sullivant said that the City is not responsible for providing bathroom access and that they would need to take the issue up with Transdev. Ms. Muirheid asked if MMT could provide the drivers with hand sanitizers; Ms. McCauley said she would check with the MMT marketing department. Ms. Sullivant said her biggest concern is the Downtown Terminal restroom access. Ms. McCauley said she would email the security contractor and the City department responsible for providing access.

Ms. McCauley moved on to the hazards associated with crossing Transit Drive and noted Gary Pittman had brought the issue up several times in previous meetings. She said the City's Traffic Engineering Division had not recommended adding a crosswalk given the crossing area is on a curve but noted they had installed "No Parking" signs. She added that hopefully the issues would be lessened when the fixed-route contractor moves to the new building at 1190 Transit Drive. She said she did not believe there was a lot of traffic down at the end of Transit Drive but that the Committee could revisit the issue after the move.

Ms. McCauley explained that the next issue, illegal passing, had come to light through complaints from downtown shuttle drivers. Ms. Sullivant said motorists pass illegally everywhere and to both fixed-route and Metro Mobility vehicles.

Tablet securement related to paratransit vehicles. Ms. McCauley said this item had been mitigated since new mounts had been installed.

"Deliveries Downtown" related to vehicles parking in the medians, making it harder for the buses to maneuver. For "Snow and Ice on Transit Drive," MMT clarified which party was responsible for which area (contractors, MMT, etc.) and noted MMT had also talked to the City's Streets Division who had begun plowing Transit Drive. "Radio Placement" dealt with the location of the radios in the smaller paratransit vehicles. Ms. McCauley noted she had asked for additional information but did not think she had heard anything. Ms. Muirheid noted there are some fixed-route buses that have radios mounted in inconvenient places.

Regarding "Tablet Holder Placement," Ms. McCauley said she believed this was also taken care of with the new mounts. She also noted that the driver shortage was identified as a hazard – drivers were taking on more overtime and may be tired. Ms. McCauley said that hazard was where the former Committee discussions ended. She also noted the following items including frozen mirrors, lack of snow brushes, and lighting at 1070. Ms. Sullivant said the buses now have new snow brushes and thanked Mr. Heafner for providing them.

In the interest of time and due to the lack of further information, Ms. McCauley suggested she send the Register out for Committee review and that the Committee look at it again next meeting to ensure nothing has been missed. Ms. Sullivant said she had several new items to discuss; Ms. McCauley suggested the Committee move on to Item V (Updates on Previous Safety Topics).

V. Updates on Previous Safety Topics

Ms. McCauley noted there were several stops on the SRR that needed addressing. She said she needed to provide a report. She noted the Committee had already discussed the Terminal restroom issues and asked if there were other topics that need to be addressed.

Ms. Sullivant asked about the driver barriers. Ms. McCauley said MMT was looking into which pot of funding to use for the barriers but noted that since the Safety Plan needed updating, procurement could not happen. Ms. Sullivant noted the hardware is still on the buses and the agency still had the barriers – was there any way the barriers could be reinstalled? Ms. McCauley said she had reached out to other agencies, specifically RTD in Denver and CDOT (Bustang) to ask if their alternative mountings had caused any issues. She said RTD noted an increase in repetitive motion injuries. Ms. Clements asked if the barriers could be remounted the way they used to be. Ms. McCauley explained that they were removed because of issues with glare, resulting in a safety hazard. Ms. Muirheid suggested the barriers be cut down a few inches to alleviate the glare. Ms. McCauley said MMT does not have that capability.

Ms. Sullivant noted it would be months before anything would be installed and said that she felt someone would have to be shot, stabbed, or killed before anything would be done. Ms. McCauley noted the material would not protect against gunshots or knives. Ms. Sullivant said that fixed-route drivers have nothing to protect them and that at least paratransit drivers have a door they can use. Ms. Sullivant said the barriers provide drivers time to react. She said people have threatened to come back and shoot drivers in the last month and that people had stood and yelled in their faces. She noted the uptick in violence that had been occurring around the country and said she felt angry that it will take someone getting shot, stabbed, or killed to get anything done.

Ms. Sullivant said there is an anti-glare coating that can be applied to the barrier. Mr. VanWinkle said the coating is not DOT approved and cannot be used. Ms. McCauley explained the situation involves a known issue with glare; Ms. Sullivant said glare does not happen in the daytime – only mornings and nights. She felt that if the barriers were mounted like RTD has mounted them, it would take care of the issue. Ms. McCauley said then there would be risk of repetitive injury. Ms. Sullivant asked how many repetitive injury issues there were when the barriers were in the buses; Ms. McCauley noted the barriers were not installed in the way that RTD had installed them. Ms. Sullivant said she did not care how they were mounted – she said she thought it was crazy the issue had been debated for six months with no outcome. Ms. McCauley said MMT had done research and has a path forward with new items. Ms. Sullivant suggested the security guards be placed on the buses. She said the drivers were only asking for a piece of plexiglass that would give the drivers a chance to fight back. She said that since the plexiglass had been removed, many drivers have had COVID. She said the plexiglass does keep germs from getting to the drivers. Ms. McCauley said the issue is that there is a known problem with glare, which makes reinstallation impossible. The alternative mounting was researched, and repetitive injury issues came to light. Ms. McCauley said the best solution would be a new barrier, but that the solution would take time.

Ms. Sullivant noted that Ms. Muirheid's bus had been shot at with a pellet gun just last week. Mr. VanWinkle added that it was nothing new, unfortunately. Ms. Muirheid said she had reported the incident but that she did not think anything had been done. Ms. Sullivant related that her daughter had been a passenger in a bus several years ago when someone threw a rock at the bus that shattered its window. Ms. Muirheid said there was a gentleman on her bus near the window when

the pellets hit the bus and said she thought she knew right where the shots came from. Ms. Sullivant said there are places on every route that are dangerous. Mr. VanWinkle said he believed it was the second window this year that had been shot.

Ms. Sullivant said the lack of barriers is a huge issue and that the Union would be speaking to City Council the following Tuesday. She said that Council needed to know what was going on. Ms. Sullivant said she had lobbied at Capitol Hill last Tuesday and spoke to Colorado's Senators. She said both Senator Bennet and Senator Hickenlooper were surprised the barriers had been removed. Ms. McCauley said that now that the Safety Plan had been approved, MMT can move forward procuring new barriers.

Ms. Sullivant asked if Ms. McCauley went up to look at RTD's buses. Ms. McCauley said she had called. Ms. Sullivant said they are the same barriers MMT had – why had they not been removed? Ms. McCauley asked if the drivers at RTD had had the same complaints about glare. Ms. McCauley suggested the Safety Committee could make a recommendation.

Ms. Sullivant said she thought it was funny that the drivers had been complaining about glare for a year and a half before anything was done. Ms. McCauley said she learned about the issue in a Safety Committee meeting and had them removed the next month. Mr. Harper asked if there was a timeframe for retrofitting. Ms. McCauley said MMT had not considered retrofitting, but rather procuring a new solution. She said she was reminded of one issue where a driver had been pinned in the seat by the plexiglass and that the passenger assaulting him kept using the plexiglass to smack him. She noted the barriers can be used both ways. Ms. McCauley said she understood the issue, but the suggested solution was not the right one. Ms. Sullivant said she believed retrofitting would be the best short-term solution. She said the new barriers would take more than a year to be installed and did not want to be without protection for that long. She said there would be new laws that would make barriers standard in buses. Ms. Sullivant said she was bringing this issue up because if one of the drivers gets shot or stabbed, the City would be sued more than it ever has.

Mr. VanWinkle said he did not disagree but wanted to address certain things. He said that first, the material the driver barriers are made of is polycarbonate rather than plexiglass. The barriers, he said, were put in and designed to shield the drivers, to a degree, from disease. He said there was never any security designed into the barriers. He said he understood what Ms. Sullivant was saying, but that the barriers would not stop a bullet. Ms. Sullivant said she knew the barriers would not stop a bullet. Mr. VanWinkle said that was what she had been using as an example. He said the barriers would not stop a bullet and would not stop people from stabbing the drivers. He said the barriers were made specifically to stop people from coughing on the drivers and noted even that was not perfect. Ms. Sullivant agreed it was not the best solution for germs, but said she believes the barrier does give the drivers protection. She said the barrier gives drivers time to react. Mr. VanWinkle said he would disagree. He has 26 years of law enforcement experience and stabbings happen very quickly. Perpetrators need only to stab a driver in the leg where there are major arteries to cause damage. He said the group needs to be fair in understanding the barriers were not designed to provide security. Ms. Sullivant agreed the barriers were designed for COVID but said they did protect the drivers. She said someone tried to reach inside one, which gave that driver time to react. Mr. VanWinkle said the person only had to rush the driver – the barrier would not have withstood such force.

Ms. Sullivant said drivers have had passengers coughing on them, spitting on them, and throwing urine on them – the barrier does protect them. Mr. VanWinkle said that if anyone wanted to throw something on the drivers, they still could because the barrier does not cover the driver completely. Ms. Muirheid agreed.

Ms. McCauley asked if the drivers were reporting those incidents to dispatch. Ms. Sullivant said she was working on that because the FTA is going to require reporting of those incidents in October. Ms. McCauley said April was actually the requirement and that MMT had already reported those incidents they received. Mr. Bryant agreed.

Ms. McCauley asked the Committee if the members wanted to recommend reinstalling barriers, even though there is a known safety issue with glare. Ms. Sullivant said she did and Ms. Clements agreed. Ms. Sullivant moved that the barriers be reinstated. Ms. Muirheid seconded the motion. ***Motion failed 4-4 with Ms. McCauley, Mr. Heafner, Mr. Bryant, and Mr. VanWinkle dissenting.***

Mr. Art Aguilar questioned how the motion failed if it was deadlocked. Ms. McCauley pointed him to the handout (Exhibit A), which states, “A tie vote is a lost vote since it is not a majority.”

Ms. Clements felt the tie votes may be an issue in the future since the frontline employees will vote together and management will vote together. Ms. McCauley said that discussing what happens in a deadlocked vote is something the Committee can discuss. Ms. Sullivant said that she would bring it up when she met with the Mayor.

VI. New Business

Fixed-Route Driver Seats

Ms. Sullivant said that bus seats are still a problem. She said she was called by the driver of J151 earlier that day; she met the driver on route. She said that the Committee is worried about the plexiglass causing repetitive injuries, but the seats are causing sciatica and major health issues to the drivers. Ms. McCauley asked if Ms. Sullivant knew what was wrong with seat, specifically. Ms. Muirheid explained the seat leans to the right and causes the driver to lean also. Ms. Muirheid also said that in J1709, she sits on a bar.

Ms. McCauley asked if the seats were being written up on the DVIRs. Mr. VanWinkle shook his head, no. Ms. Muirheid and Ms. Sullivant agreed that the seats were probably not being written up any longer, but the drivers would go back to doing so. Ms. Muirheid said she felt like nothing was being done with the write-ups. She said in a previous Safety Committee meeting, they were told the seats were being fixed. Mr. VanWinkle said the maintenance shop sends out the seats for rebuilding. Mr. VanWinkle said the former Fleet Coordinator at MMT had a seat rebuilding plan. Any seats needing replacement that are not on the plan will need to be approved prior to rebuilding. Ms. Muirheid asked if Mr. VanWinkle knew how many seats were on the list, per year. Mr. VanWinkle said he did not know. He said he had not seen any seats written up this year, except in the case of one driver who seems to write up every seat he sits in.

Ms. McCauley proposed the frontline representatives work with the drivers to ensure seat problems are being written on the DVIRs. Ms. McCauley committed to speaking with MMT’s Fleet Coordinator about the replacement plan and at the next meeting, the Committee will look at what has been written up since this meeting.

Electric Buses

Ms. Sullivan asked whether there are signs in the electric buses that inform the passengers the buses can catch on fire, are dangerous, and that a driver is not going to save passengers. Ms. Sullivan said fixed-route drivers need proper training. She said the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) recommends six (6) hours of training and said the maximum amount any driver here has had is fifteen (15) minutes. Ms. Sullivan said someone asked her where the battery was and she did not know because she was not trained. She also said she does not know how to pre-trip or post-trip one of them because she was not trained. Ms. Sullivan said Ms. Clements was given five (5) minutes and does not know where the battery is.

Ms. Sullivan said RTD's first electric bus burned to the ground, she thought due to a heater issue. Ms. Sullivan said she does not like the electric buses and is scared of them after what she has learned. She said she was told that when electric buses catch on fire, they let off a fume, and everyone needs to evacuate right away. She said the drivers cannot help passengers because those fumes will kill the driver and passengers, both. She feels there should be a sign notifying the public of the hazards. She said if she was driving, she would definitely open all the doors and tell her passengers to get off the bus. She said there needs to be better training – she went out to ask drivers questions about what they knew about the electric buses and was concerned.

Ms. Sullivan said she was told electric buses are not supposed to be charged in the garage because of danger of an arc flash. She said the union mechanics (elsewhere) were asked what to do if the bus catches fire and they said, "Run." They said first, the bus has to be pushed out of the garage. Ms. Sullivan said the safety issues on these buses are scary and hopes the City is not looking to buy additional electric buses. She asked if hybrid buses were an option. Ms. McCauley said all types of buses are being evaluated now but believed the City had already received a grant for an additional two electric buses. She said she would check on the electric grant. Ms. Sullivan said it did not matter to her since she could not fit in the bus. She asked that before the buses are purchased, the City should ensure they can accommodate every driver. Mr. VanWinkle explained that the issue with the current electric buses is not so much the seat as it is the steering column, which does not tilt. Ms. McCauley said they are currently reviewing proposals. Ms. Sullivan said Maryland sold off all of their buses and purchased Proterra buses and had nothing but problems. Ms. McCauley said she was aware and had spoken to other agencies with similar problems.

Ms. McCauley said she would work with the Operations Supervisor to in turn work with Transdev on the training. Ms. McCauley will also look into signage and will update the Committee at the next meeting.

Mr. Harper asked if there would be training for the mechanics, too. Ms. McCauley asked Mr. VanWinkle if the mechanics need additional training. Mr. VanWinkle asked Mr. Harper what kind of training he was referring to. Ms. Sullivan asked if the mechanics had all of the special tools required and explained that the union had been working to ensure safety when the buses are not under warranty. She asked if the mechanics use special tools and wear suits and gloves. Mr. VanWinkle said there are no special tools; Ms. Sullivan said there were.

Mr. Aguilar said there are special wrenches that will not ground. He said the mechanics at his former property went through extensive training and that they had the agency buy the tools since they were so expensive. He said regular tools will not work and mechanics must have the insulated tools. Mr.

VanWinkle asked if Mr. Aguilar was working on the low-voltage side or the high-voltage side. Mr. Aguilar said suits and insulated tools must be used on the high-voltage side. Mr. VanWinkle said they were not working on the high-voltage side. Mr. Aguilar asked why not; Mr. VanWinkle replied that Proterra takes care of that. Mr. Aguilar asked what happens when the warranty period is over; Mr. VanWinkle said the City bought an extended warranty. Mr. Aguilar asked whether the warranty was infinite; Mr. VanWinkle said it was a 12-year warranty. Mr. Aguilar asked Mr. VanWinkle if there was a watch person; before Mr. VanWinkle could speak, Mr. Aguilar said, "The answer is 'no.'" Mr. VanWinkle confirmed and then Mr. Aguilar said that maintenance was in violation and threatened to call the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT). Mr. Aguilar related a story about an arc flash that had put two union members in the hospital. Ms. McCauley asked that Mr. VanWinkle have a chance to explain.

Mr. VanWinkle said that maintenance is not working on the high-voltage side, which is where an arc flash comes from. The high-voltage side is where the equipment Mr. Aguilar spoke of is required. Mr. VanWinkle said the mechanics do wear the proper personal protective equipment (PPE) required for work on the low-voltage side. He reiterated that Proterra does all the work on the high-voltage side.

Mr. Aguilar asked if Proterra does the work on site, in MMT's maintenance facility. Mr. VanWinkle said they do. Mr. Aguilar asked if work was done in the shop; Mr. VanWinkle confirmed. Mr. Aguilar asked if work was done on the high-voltage side; Mr. VanWinkle said they had not had a bus that had needed that work. Mr. Aguilar said he would come in and watch if that happened. Mr. Aguilar said the union was trying to figure out a design of the shop so that the bus can be removed quickly. He said the fire department will not engage an electric vehicle fire, so if the bus is in the building, the building will burn. Mr. Aguilar said safety, to him, is number one.

Ms. McCauley summarized that it sounded like Mr. Aguilar and Mr. VanWinkle were talking about two separate things. She said it sounded like Mr. VanWinkle and his team wear the proper PPE for the work. Ms. Sullivant asked if the electric buses are towed when they break down on route. Ms. McCauley confirmed that they are towed and Mr. VanWinkle added that only one bus has needed towing so far.

Mr. Aguilar said at the next meeting there should be a response for the operators. He also said that if Transdev did not want to train their mechanics until they are organized, he would organize them. Then he would be pushing hard. He said he did not care if MMT had a vendor on the property – safety is number one. Ms. McCauley again asked Mr. VanWinkle if they had had the proper training; Mr. VanWinkle again responded that they had.

Cameras in Mirrors

Ms. Sullivant asked about a picture she had been sent of a camera in a mirror. Ms. McCauley said she thought it might be part of the Lytx pilot program. Mr. Bryant said the picture he had seen was of a Lytx camera, but that he did not understand the mirror part. He said the camera was mounted on the interior of the windshield. Ms. Muirheid said the cameras had been installed in the lower part of the exterior mirror. Ms. McCauley pulled up the picture and noted it looked like the camera was mounted on the windshield. The group looked at the picture and agreed. Ms. Sullivant said she had not seen it – she had just received a picture.

Ms. Muirheid asked what the objective was of the cameras. Ms. McCauley responded it was a pilot program and asked Mr. Bryant and Mr. Heafner if they would explain further. Mr. Bryant said it was a pilot program for both paratransit and fixed-route vehicles. He said he believed there were four (4) paratransit vehicles and three (3) fixed-route vehicles. The program was formerly known as DriveCam. Mr. Bryant said he thought the union might have been aware of the program from other properties. He explained it is primarily a safety coaching tool. The camera alerts when an issue arises. Ms. Sullivan asked why the program was not discussed in their contract. Mr. Heafner said it was something that could be discussed in a different forum.

Ms. Muirheid asked where the cameras focus. Mr. Bryant said it is a dual camera – one faces forward out the window and the other focuses on the driver. Ms. Sullivan clarified that it is watching the traffic? Mr. Bryant said yes, it watches out in front of the driver. Mr. Harper asked if it flags events. Mr. Bryant said that it does. Ms. Sullivan asked what the Lytx camera does that the existing cameras do not. Mr. Heafner explained there are accelerometers in the Lytx cameras and that they are event driven. The cameras currently installed in the bus are just cameras – the footage can be reviewed afterward at any time. The Lytx cameras are triggered by events, such as hard braking. Ms. McCauley summarized that the Lytx cameras are similar, but they are focused on the driver and triggered by events. Ms. Sullivan compared it to the tools car insurance companies use to give participants better rates; Ms. McCauley and Mr. Heafner said the Lytx device is similar. Ms. McCauley explained that hard braking events might correlate with a high instance of passenger falls. Transdev could then coach the driver on the results and give pointers on how to brake easier. Ms. McCauley specified that coaching would be done by Transdev.

Ms. Sullivan said the union and Transdev would need to talk about how the cameras would be used. Mr. Harper suggested Transdev give the union information with more lead time before instituting a change. Ms. Sullivan asked if the program is a pilot or if cameras will be installed in all buses; Mr. Heafner said it would be a pilot in three (3) fixed-route buses.

Safety Committee Meeting Schedule

Ms. McCauley asked when the next meeting should be. Mr. Heafner said Tuesdays would not be ideal. Ms. Sullivan said the Committee used to meet on Thursdays. Ms. McCauley said this meeting was first available and that the schedule could shift back to Thursdays. Ms. Sullivan suggested the second Thursday of every month. Ms. McCauley said that would be the 13th of July and asked if afternoons worked best. The group agreed. Ms. McCauley said she would send out a meeting invitation; Ms. Sullivan said she would forward the invitation to the frontline representatives.

VII. Adjourn

Ms. Sullivan moved to adjourn the meeting. Ms. Muirheid seconded the motion. ***The motion carried 8-0.*** The meeting adjourned at 3:53 p.m.

